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It is our honor here at the center to 
present CARGC Special Report: Beyond 
“Technological Exception”: Emerging 
Debates in Cuban Independent Journalism 
by Sara Garcia Santamaria. Sara is an 
Associate Professor at Universitat Jaume 
I and Universitat Blanquerna - Ramon 
Llull in Spain. She holds a Doctorate in 
Journalism Studies from the University 
of  Sheffield (UK), where her research 
explored how the Cuban state-run media 
constructs the role of  the people in public 
debate. The project draws on extensive 
ethnographic work in Cuba, including 
interviews with leading journalists, editors, 
and academics and a critical discourse 
analysis of  national newspapers over 
twenty years. Having completed her 
Ph.D., Dr. Garcia Santamaria became 
a research fellow at the Annenberg 
School for Communication, University 
of  Pennsylvania, in 2018, leading 
a Joint Digital Rights and Internet 
Freedom Research & Advocacy Project. 
Her doctoral and postdoctoral work 
emphasizes the importance of  overcoming 
binary discourses and accounting for 
the social complexity of  a changing 
media environment in Cuba. This report 
represents a continuation of  that work, 
particularly in light of  the shifting and 
volatile media environment that Cubans 
and Cuban journalists are currently 
experiencing.
This CARGC Special Report makes a 
crucial and timely contribution to current 
understandings of  Cuba’s mediasphere, its 
mythologized technological exceptionalism, 
and the impact of  digital technologies on 
the practice of  independent journalism 
at a critical moment for the Caribbean 
nation. The protests of  July 11, 2021 – 
organized online, spanning more than 
40 different cities, and broadcasted live 
through Facebook until the government 
shut the Internet down that afternoon- 
represents an unprecedented activation 
of  civil society’s organizational power 
through digital technologies. Independent 
journalists have been crucial in the 
covering of  the protests as well as their 
aftermath. Because the state media did 
not cover the protests while they were 
happening, most of  the reconstructions of  
the events have been done by independent 
journalists working on the island or 
abroad. This report uncovers how and 
why independent journalism grows on the 
island within a hostile environment. 
The massive protests and the subsequent 
governmental and military crackdown 
have elicited the predictable responses 
from the West that go from interventionist 
and hostile discourses nursed on cold-war 
logics to extractive apologisms of  Cuba’s 
state violence and condescending dismissal 
of  everyday Cubans’ sovereignty. The 
entanglements embodied in Cuba’s July 
protests have been - too soon- leveled 
to the common binaries of  ideological 
tribalisms. Tribalisms that -needs to be 
said- are ingrained even in everyday 
Cubans but represent geopolitical conflicts 
that largely ignores them.  
Sara’s report serves as an antidote to 
such dangerous faciles and a conduit to 
understanding the myriad of  complex 
circumstances influencing the practice 
of  independent journalism and the use 
of  digital technologies in contemporary 
Cuba. This work painstakingly traces 
and complicates the impact of  digital 
technologies on citizens and independent 
journalists. It examines how journalists and 
civil society negotiate internet affordances 
and legitimacy and legality with the 
state. The last section of  the report 
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explores the consequences that a lack of  
“official” legitimacy and legality have on 
journalists’ careers and how they reassert 
their right to exist. Methodologically, this 
report’s analysis derives from 22 in-depth 
interviews with Cuban experts, academics, 
and independent journalists working 
across eight independent media outlets. It 
also includes a rigorous genealogy of  the 
latest regulations on freedom of  speech 
and creation, the practice of  journalism, 
and online speech passed by the Cuban 
government. 
The report lays bare how social 
actors position themselves politically 
rejecting the traditional revolutionary 
vs. antirevolutionary divide—these 
reclamations of  other ways of  existing 
challenge the Revolution ontologies and 
those derived from the West.  As Sara 
puts it: “The need to go beyond simplistic 
accounts of  Cuba is a matter of  analytical 
precision” (Garcia Santamaria, 2021). Yet, 
the need to rid ourselves from canons and 
modes of  inquiry aimed at rendering “the 
other” legible is far from being overcome. 
Indeed, it is far from a problem exclusively 
to those seeking to study or speak of  Cuba 
-whether inside or outside the island. 
This summer, as we were completing final 
reviews of  the report, Cubans took to the 
streets in large numbers. Simultaneously 
the president of  Haiti was assassinated, 
an earthquake hit the island, long-drawn-
out crisis and food shortages loomed 
over Lebanon, fires raged from Turkey to 
Greece, and the Taliban took power in 
Afghanistan in record time. 
Much more needs to be done as an 
academic community to center and learn 
from those for whom such events are not 
novelties or a turn on global geopolitics 
but a fact of  their daily lives and ways of  
being. This special report is CARGCs’ 
latest and modest contribution to that life-
long endeavor that constitutes empowering 
and complicating the global south. Here at 
the center, fellows, post-docs, leadership, 
and staff at CARGC commit our resolute 
efforts to the need for expanding deep 
regional expertise and interdisciplinary 
inquiry within the field of  Global 
Communication. The hope is that we can 
come out the other end of  this historical 
moment in which political tribalism, global 
warming, police and state violence, racism 
and other forms of  discrimination, and 
geopolitical imperialisms have sequestered 
the future. In that case, the adequate 
question no longer seems to be: can the 
“other” speak? But is there a future if  they 
don’t?
Mariela Morales Suárez 
Doctoral student, Annenberg School 
for Communication 
Graduate Fellow, Center for Advance 
Research in Global Communication
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Beyond “Technological Exception”:
Emerging Debates in Cuban Independent Journalism
Sara García Santamaría, Ph.D.
Universitat Jaume I
INTRODUCTION
This report examines the latest developments in the emergent wave of  Cuban independent 
journalism, taking a special look at the impact of  both digital technologies and recent regulation. 
As access to the Internet and digital technologies has increased, it has changed what it means 
to be a citizen and a journalist, on the Island. More precisely, it has given visibility to a range of  
social identities that go beyond the traditional journalist as a soldier or a mercenary of  the United 
States.1 The need for complex accounts of  ongoing transformations in Cuba is visible both in 
academic and journalistic publications, which are used as secondary sources for this report. In 
order to offer more contextualized and detailed data, I conducted 22 in-depth interviews with 
Cuban experts and independent journalists2 working for eight independent media outlets: AND 
Cuba, Árbol Invertido, Cibercuba, Diario de Cuba, El Estornudo, El Toque, Periodismo de Barrio. and Tremenda 
Nota. While this report focuses on emergent media outlets, I have interviewed journalists working 
for the state-run media in previous works, including my 2018 report (Garcia Santamaria 2018a, 
2018b), and most of  the interviewees have worked for the state-run media before disengaging 
themselves from it.
1 The idea of the journalist as a soldier comes from José Martí, 19th century Cuban intellectual and 
independence leader that is considered a national hero. This idea was reframed after the Revolution within 
the 1965 reorganization of media outlets in terms of property and editorial teams. It is worth noting that many 
organizational aspects of the Soviet media model were incorporated in the mid-1960s in a context of Cold War 
in which Cuba felt globally isolated and in a permanent war with the United States (Oller Alonso and Olivera 
2016; Garcia Santamaria 2018c). After the reforms, mass media became a useful channel for spreading Che 
Guevara’s idea of a “new man,” and help rebuilding the economic and ideological bases of the state. In this 
context, journalists were given a collective political task, rather than an individual and professionally oriented one 
(Marrero 2006; García Luis 2013).
2 The interviews were conducted online between March 2019 and July 2020. Five of the initial interviews were 
updated for this report. All the interviews but two have taken place online. For ethical reasons, I have decided to 
anonymize independent journalists, who appear identified by a code composed of two letters, R (respondent) 
and J (journalist), as well as an assigned number. The experts, however, are identified by their name and their 
academic affiliation since they are all doctors or doctoral students in the field of Media and Communication. All 
the interviewees are Cuban, and only one of the experts identifies as Cuban American. The idea was to select 
young interviewees in their 20s and 30s because they are the ones that have created emergent independent 
media outlets over the last seven years or so and constitute their main workforce (Díaz 2018). Regarding experts, I 
consider that young Cuban scholars are often a missing voice when we analyze Cuba even if they are often those 
studying the newest phenomena in the Island.
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I have spent a great deal of  time trying to understand how Cuban journalists working for the 
state-run media make sense of  their professional work and their ideological commitment to the 
Revolution (Garcia Santamaria 2018b). Through this work, I have sat with some of  the best 
Cuban journalists, regardless of  whether they work for independent or state-run media outlets, 
beginning between 2013 and 2017, a period that was key for identifying young journalists’ hope 
of  changing Cuban journalism from within the system, as well as the progressive erosion of  their 
dreams. Crucially, in October 2011, the Cuban Communist Party issued a document that set as 
a priority getting “rid of  self-censorship, mediocrity, bureaucratic and sugar-coated language, 
idleness, rhetoric, triumphalism, and banality” in the media (PCC, 2011). This was formulated 
in light of  the “Updating of  the Economic and Social Model” (“Actualización del Modelo Económico 
y Social”), which was announced in the VI Congress of  the Cuban Communist Party (2011) and 
extended until 2021 during the VII Congress. Just as in other authoritarian contexts, such as 
soviet Russia or current China (Repnikova 2017; Roudakova 2017), Cuban journalists have found 
themselves caught between the regime’s calls to exercise a “responsible criticism” and their fear to 
do so legally unprotected. 
Attempts to convince journalists that a change from within the system is not only possible, but also 
more stable for the country, have been pervasive since the mid-1970s and have managed to deter 
journalists from looking for change outside the institutional channels, at least temporarily. It is by 
following the trajectory of  some of  those first interviewees that my research has evolved. How have 
they made sense of  their disengagement from the state-owned media? How do they understand 
their re-engagement in new academic or independent media projects? (Garcia Santamaria 
forthcoming).
The need to go beyond simplistic accounts of  Cuba is a matter of  analytical precision. Leaving 
behind narratives of  “binary socialism” (Yurchak 2003, 6), recent ethnographic research has 
highlighted citizens’ complex processes of  (dis)identification with the system as the “digital 
revolution” unfolds (Henken and Garcia Santamaria 2021).3 Rather than clear-cut positions, 
Muñoz (1999) has suggested that there are many ways in which individuals negotiate their identity 
beyond pure support or opposition to their culture. In the Cuban context, we often find what 
Holbraad (2014, 1) has named Cubans’ “visceral allegiance to their Revolution,” paradoxically 
combined with a “deep disaffection” with the revolutionary project. Applying this to the field of  
Cuban journalism, this report considers that it is essential to go beyond binary positions and to 
acknowledge that, growing up within the system, it is not straightforward for young journalists 
to break away from it. Furthermore, the process is not linear but irregular and even paradoxical. 
Therefore, this report does not aim at being another “state of  the art” or summary of  the latest 
developments in Cuban journalism, but the goal is to stress the levels of  complexity that traverse 
current transformations in the Cuban mediasphere—a complexity that needs to be taken into 
account if  we want to go beyond binary and simplistic narratives.
3 See for instance the work conducted by Jennifer Cearns, Paloma Duong, or Anne Natvig, among others, 
collected in an upcoming volume (Henken and Garcia Santamaria 2021).
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Context is essential for understanding the dynamics that influence independent journalists’ 
legitimacy and legality in Cuba. Several factors intertwine and influence the state’s response. A 
few ideas stand out from the interviews. The first is the geopolitical context, the fact that Cuba 
has lost support in Latin America due to the weakening of  left-wing governments and the crisis 
in Venezuela. This has taken place parallel to Donald Trump’s legacy of  restrictive measures 
against the Island (Chokshi and Robles 2019), including against remittances and non-family visits, 
which have contributed to weakening the Cuban economy and dashing people’s hopes for a better 
future. In fact, the Island is facing a serious food, basic goods, and energy shortage, the so-called 
“coyuntura” (Mesa-Lago 2019), which was officially announced in September 2019 and has only 
worsened amidst the COVID-19 pandemic (Curbelo 2019). 
Additionally, the few last years have seen a reactivation of  civil society that is still unfolding, as we 
have seen in the latest July 2021 protests. Some experts see 2019 as the year in which vulnerable 
civil society communities started mobilizing themselves (Padrón Cueto 2020a). A legal march in 
defense of  animal rights, organized to a great extent online, inspired other initiatives, such as a 
non-authorized LGTBIQ march on March 11, 2019 that gathered around 300 people and was 
met with strong repression. Other civil society communities have also asked for the recognition 
of  their cause.  This includes SNet connections (a protest on August 17, 2019 was deterred by 
the police), asking for marriage equality (Article 68 that granted was removed from the new 
constitution), laws against gender violence (with a group of  forty intellectuals signing a petition 
in December 2019), as well as campaigns to free arrested journalists.4 However, it is important 
to consider that many social practices require people to position themselves politically, yet do not 
necessarily place them within the traditional revolutionary versus antirevolutionary divide. For 
instance, the two main debates that have gained resonance online and reached massive audiences 
have been about animal protection and sexual diversity rights (Rodríguez).5 While both are in 
line with the official discourse, they have been somehow forgotten and then reappropriated by 
“alternative” voices.
The report is organized in two main blocs, composed of  four parts each. The first bloc 
contextualizes the impact of  digital technologies on citizens’ life (sections 1.1. and 1.2.) and 
on independent journalism (sections 1.3 and 1.4). The second bloc of  the report examines the 
intersection between legitimacy and legality in Cuban independent journalism. The two first 
sections (2.1 and 2.2.) contextualize the perceived legitimacy of  the emergent mediasphere, as well 
as recent regulations that have threatened its legality. Then, the report goes on to examine the 
consequences that a lack of  “official” legitimacy and legality have on journalists’ careers, and the 
ways they have found to reassert their right to exist (sections 2.3. and 2.4).
4 The SNets are clandestine networks of Wi-Fi antennas and broadband cables connected to each other 
through rooftops through an intranet, offering access to social media, video sharing and online videogames.
5 Fidel Alejandro Rodríguez, Universidad de La Habana. Online interview conducted 07/10/2020.
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PART 1: DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INDEPENDENT 
JOURNALISM IN CUBA
1.1. The new “post-socialist” citizen 
According to Rancière (2010), politics and aesthetics are forms of  dissensus that not only alter 
existing power relations but introduce new subjects and objects into our range of  perception. That 
is, politics and aesthetics reorder our perceptions and space, unchaining bodies from an officially 
assigned place and disrupting existing logics of  belonging. Following this notion, we could say 
that digital practices have helped queer the Cuban space. The underlying idea is that they enable 
the movement, mobility, and mobilization of  new conflicting identities (Munthe-Kaas 2015). The 
concept of  queerness is useful for analyzing “deviating” identities (Perez-Torres 2006, xvii): the 
liminal processes of  transgression of  those who are perceived as different, as bizarre, as non-binary 
and non-normative, as emancipated, as punk, as the oppressed “other.” For instance, Cuban 
scholar Darién Sánchez Nicolás considers that the development of  digital practices in Cuba 
challenges the well-educated, white, and heterosexual image of  journalists dominant in the West.6 
In fact, many Cuban influencers identify themselves as being queer, racialized and coming from 
working class backgrounds. 
Over the last decade or so, Cubans have been using digital technologies in ways that give visibility 
to and create new types of  Cuban subjects whose values, fantasies, affective ties and goals differ 
from those prioritized by the government. For instance, growing Internet access, especially through 
cell phones, has facilitated a wave of  sociopolitical mobilizations organized online, facilitating a 
sort of  #hashtag activism. Some of  the campaigns have been addressed at political processes, such 
as voting for the 2019 constitution, while others have dealt with human rights issues (freeing artists 
or journalists, defending LGTBIQ rights or animal rights), or Internet access. This has been the 
case of  the SNet and the #LowerInternetPrices (#BajenLosPreciosDeInternet) campaign. It is 
important to note that, while Cubans are increasingly expressing their grievances on social media, 
these movements had not reach ordinary people until July 11th, 2021, and even then we cannot 
speak of  a widespread social unrest. Other civil society groups, such as feminist movements, the 
LGTBIQ community or animal rights activists, have been active on social networks, and even 
claiming new regulations. 
The “new Cuban subjectivities” make visible “other” identities that go from the explicitly political 
to the defense of  social causes and personal identifications, or the rights of  the cuentapropista, to 
participate in the private economic sector. For instance, Cuban scholar Darien Sánchez studies the 
way in which Cubans and their diaspora use digital technologies in order to reconstruct precarious 
domestic spaces in Cuba and, in doing so, develop new types of  (dis)identifications:  “The fact that 
people invest in or try to use domestic spaces as centers of  economic practice, even if  discreet, 
is a way of  subverting, or disregarding, or separating themselves from the social and economic 
6 Darién Sánchez Nicolás, Concordia University. Online interview conducted 07/09/2020.
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systems established in Cuba. They are pretty radical political practices in themselves, practices 
that allow people to have agency, to develop themselves in the face of  a negligence or the lack of  
governmental capacity to face social needs in Cuba.”7    
An interesting aspect is that Cubans on the Island can, nowadays, follow the same “media diet” as 
their relatives abroad, highlights Miranda García.8 For instance, some journalists who left Cuba 
recently consider that they are still “mentally there” (RJ12).9 Through the visibility of  Cuban 
problems and scarcity in Cubans’ “shared media diet,” care and affect networks are extending 
beyond the family circle, according to Darien Sánchez’s research.10
Digital technologies and growing Internet access have consolidated the mainstream capacity 
of  transnational affective communities, some of  which had already started using technological 
innovations for community-building purposes well before the turn of  the century (Beliso-De 
Jesús 2015). Paloma Duong (2021) has called “mobile postsocialisms” those forms of  new media 
practices that defy the ontological view of  the Revolution, as well as its ways of  organizing 
political, economic, social and affective life. This type of  postsocialist subjects inhabit a hybrid 
media system (Chadwick 2013) and a hybrid type of  “cultural capitalism” (Jelača et al. 2017), and 
claim a place within global economic and communication flows. What “Paparazzi Cubano” (Alain 
Lambert Rodríguez, allegedly the first Cuban to retransmit on Facebook live from the Island) 
and other YouTubers and influencers are doing is “to rescue the visual archaeology of  what we 
consider the essence of  Cubanness,” something that unites people beyond ideological affiliations 
and politics because “Cubans who might not share the same ideology still share the same cultural 
heritage” (Darien Sánchez).11 In other words, digital technologies are enabling business, cultural 
and affective practices that transcend any political ideology. This, of  course, has an impact on 
people’s daily habits that goes well beyond their media consumption.
1.2. Overcoming the Cuban “Technological Exception”
There have been many accounts of  Cuba being “the Island of  the disconnected” (Ogden 2021), 
or as having yet to join 21st century connectivity (Davis 2016). Outside depictions of  Cuba as 
technologically lacking, as the “technological other” because of  its low levels of  Internet access, 
have been widespread in international media, filling our imaginaries with narrow and limited 
accounts (Davis 2016). While Internet access has indeed been low and has yet to reach regional 
standards, “there are many ways of  understanding technological modernity,” explains Darien 
Sánchez.12
7 Darién Sánchez Nicolás, Concordia University. Online interview conducted 07/09/2020.
8 Miranda García, Michigan University. Online interview conducted 07/03/2020.
9 Interview number RJ12 to independent journalist. Online interview conducted 07/04/2020.
10 Darién Sánchez Nicolás, Concordia University. Online interview conducted 09/07/2020.
11 Darién Sánchez Nicolás, Concordia University. Online interview conducted 07/09/2020.
12 Darién Sánchez Nicolás, Concordia University. Online interview conducted 07/09/2020.
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Western ways of  assessing the development of  digital technologies in Cuba are often reductionist. 
Despite the slow and expensive process of  connecting to the Internet, as well as purchasing 
personal computers or mobile phones, Cubans have relied on their imagination, or “invento,” in 
order to stay connected. Therefore, the idea of  a “Cuban exception” should be understood both 
as the Island’s challenging access to the Internet and to citizens’ ability to develop “homemade” 
innovations that allowed them to exchange information both online and offline. Whether living 
on the Island or abroad, Cubans have created a myriad of  open code software, creating apps and 
websites for services that replicate international ones, such as CubaMessenger or Bajanda, or massive 
off-line systems of  content distribution in ways that few other countries have seen. Some of  these 
apps focus on locating and distributing food and allow citizens [those who can afford them] “to 
keep reproducing Cuban eating habits” in the midst of  the economic crisis (Marsh 2020). 
Cuban millennials who, as a generation, are more technologically literate than their predecessors, 
have used this as a way of  developing new business opportunities and connecting customers 
(the new bourgeoisie) with new private businesses. The use of  digital technologies has improved 
citizens’ agency, allowing the creation of  peer-to-peer networks that go from access and distribution 
of  information and entertainment, services opportunities, transnational care networks between 
Cubans on the Island and those abroad, crowdsourcing or international creative collaborations. 
One of  the most known “Cuban inventos” is el “paquete seminal,” or weekly package, which consists 
of  a large nationwide network that distributes one terabyte of  data (including national and 
international press, the latest films and shows, trendy music, software, games, buying and selling 
services…) once a week. The paquete can be purchased for up to $3, depending on the amount of  
content, who is your messenger, or the day of  the week; it is purported to be Cuba’s largest private 
employer (Press 2015). The new ways of  digital entrepreneurship also include the development of  
“indymedia” projects, such as Vistar  (visual culture) or Garbos (lifestyle) led by digital millennials 
that have created independent yet non-dissident and often apolitical magazines and benefited 
from the 2014 US-Cuban thaw, which gave them an opportunity to fully unfold and reach larger 
audiences (Henken 2017). In parallel, there has been a development of  “alternative” or “hipster” 
businesses, movements and aesthetics that can be considered not just countercultural, but also 
counterrevolutionary or counter-Cuban (Cearns 2021).
Foreign attempts to use digital technologies in order to mobilize citizens against the government 
(Garcia Santamaria 2018c), and the historical US-Cuba confrontation, have influenced politicians’ 
suspicion of  the Internet in Cuba (Rodríguez Brito 2018). However, in 2012 a submarine optic 
fiber cable linked Cuba with Venezuela and Jamaica. Internet access in Cuba has been improving 
ever since, and in 2013 the Cuban government opened the first Internet public centers (called 
“salas de navegación”). One year later, Cubans gained access to a government-run email service on 
mobile phones and in 2015 it opened 35 public Wi-Fi hotspots, reaching 1072 in 2020 according 
to official data (ETECSA, 2020). In 2017, Cubans started getting household Internet access (before 
it was reserved to academics, artists and some professionals) and in late 2018 people started getting 
full 3G access on mobile phones. According to recent data, 63 percent of  Cubans have Internet 
access (7.1 million users), out of  which 55% are social media users (Kemp 2020). Furthermore, 3.4 
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million connect to the Internet from their phones (Kemp 2020), with 4G reaching over 650,000 
lines (EFE 2020). However, it is important to take into account that this information draws on 
Cuban official data, which some experts have put into question (Flores 2020). 
New measures put in place in May 2019 allow citizens to connect to the Internet with their routers 
and share their signals (not for profit), which could legalize “some existing networks that have been 
secretly operated using smuggled or homemade equipment” (Semple and Cohen 2019). The new 
policy, however, regulates wireless transmission power and outdoor cables (Press 2019) and allows 
the state telecommunications company, ETECSA, to absorb existing self-managed initiatives such 
as SNets (Street Network). SNets are a clandestine network of  Wi-Fi antennas and broadband 
cables (either handmade or purchased in the black market) linked through rooftops. Initially used 
to play videogames through an intranet, they expanded to other services, such as accessing el 
paquete, using social media or video sharing. They are thought to connect around twenty thousand 
people to the Internet (CIDH 2020). Some scholars consider that the SNets have been an 
example of  Cuba’s technologically savvy population and a model of  citizen self-management and 
technological appropriation that transformed Cuban society, especially among the young living in 
Havana (Fidel Alejandro Rodríguez).13 
One of  the main recent technological changes has been people’s access to the Internet from their 
mobile phones. Digital technologies have allowed the creation of  online communities around 
independent media outlets on social networks and messaging apps, expanding to civil society. For 
instance, they have created informal groups around issues of  public concern, such as the LGTBI 
protest, the Young Filmmakers Festival or the debates around the 2019 Constitution, all of  which 
are discussed below. Cuban scholar Fidel Alejandro Rodríguez considers that digital technologies 
have fostered “associationism, self-representation, spontaneous articulations, intensive and 
extensive circulation of  information, cooperation, participation, deliberation,” but also forms of  
“confrontation, dissent, or the revision of  [official] media and political discourses.”14
1.3. Disentangling the Cuban Mediasphere
The takeoff of  a new wave of  emergent independent media projects has its roots in the context 
of  the US-Cuba thaw that started in December 2014, towards the end of  Barack Obama’s 
term. This event was important both in terms of  expanding investment in telecommunications 
on the Island, as well as putting Cuba in the spotlight. A new era of  what seemed a progressive 
depolarization demanded fresh accounts and a new generation of  critical bloggers and journalists 
gained worldwide attention.15 The new Cuba was in fashion and someone needed to narrate it; 
13 Fidel Alejandro Rodríguez, Universidad de La Habana. Online interview conducted 07/10/2020.
14 Fidel Alejandro Rodríguez, Universidad de La Habana. Online interview conducted 07/10/2020.
15 This was of course before Donald Trump won the 2016 US elections and started a new repressive wave 
against the Island.
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this task was assumed by a select group of  young and talented journalists who had lost the hope 
of  changing the system from within, and who had increasing access to the Internet and digital 
technologies. 
One of  the challenges when studying the Cuban independent mediasphere is the tendency to 
consider it as a whole when it is in fact a conglomerate of  multiple digital media outlets that follow 
different logicsand interests. In broad terms, the Cuban media system is composed of  the official 
media, religious media, oppositional media, foreign media, and emergent media outlets. Regarding 
the latter, Ted Henken (2017) differentiates between (1) digital dissidents (clearly oppositional 
projects like 14yMedio); (2) digital millennials (such as Vistar, with a cultural emphasis); (3) digital 
ecumenics (projects associated with the Catholic Church, such as the former Cuba Posible); (4) 
critical revolutionaries (led by young progressive Cubans who created non-oppositional projects 
aimed at improving society through contained criticism, such as Periodismo de Barrio); and (5) the 
digital diaspora (Spain-based project CiberCuba, for instance).
Put simply, the term “emergent digital media” refers to those projects that are independent from 
the Cuban Communist Party’s (CCP) media structure and were created around 2014, in light of  
a US-Cuba distension.16 Cuban independent journalist Elaine Díaz (2018) has published a list of  
emergent journalistic media outlets. She counted fourteen in 2018, although the list has changed.17 
She highlights that most of  them are composed by small, young teams living in Cuba and abroad, 
who collaborate with other national and international media outlets in the publication of  issues 
that are either silenced or taboo. For Cuban scholar Abel Somohano, independent media could be 
grouped according to different criteria: (1) the degree of  thematic specialization (from generalist 
to specialized outlets); (2) the type of  journalism being developed (informational, narrative, 
investigative, data journalism, etc); (3) funding (advertisement, users, third sector); 4) the main 
actors’ location (how disperse and transnational they are); or 5) their distribution (website only, el 
paquete apps, Facebook Instant Articles or Google AMP).18
The independent Cuban mediasphere has developed simultaneously with heated debates about the 
need to professionalize Cuban journalism. This does not mean that all journalism produced by the 
state-run media is essentially unprofessional. Instead, it means that the excess of  external influences 
(such as Party censorship) and the exodus of  experienced journalists fleeing an impoverished media 
system during the Periodo Especial have slowly led to progressive deprofessionalization. Efforts to 
reverse this trend are further examined in the following section.
16 There seems to be an agreement on the use of the term “independent media outlets” for referring to those 
that were created online over the last decade or so. For instance, this is the term they use in journalists’ joint 
declarations. However, other people prefer to call them “non-state-owned” (no estatales), alternative or emergent 
media outlets.
17 Periodismo de Barrio (2015), Cachivache Media (2016-2017), 14ymedio (2014), Cibercuba (2014), El 
Estornudo (2016), Diario de Cuba (2009), El Toque (2014), Hypermedia Magazine (2016), La Joven Cuba 
(2010), NegoluItion (2016), OnCuba (2012), PlayOff (2015), Postdata (2016) and Progreso Semanal (2001).
18 Abel Somohano, Universidad Iberoamericana. Online interview conducted 07/03/2020.
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1.4. From Polarization to Professionalization
Cuban political culture has been shaped by certain values since the nineteenth century 
Independence Wars, such as intransigence, intolerance, or the criminalization of  dissent (Bobes 
2007).19 The alleged unity between the Party and the people is at the base of  all intellectual debates 
in Cuba (Garcia Santamaria 2021). If, as Fidel Castro told intellectuals in 1961, “the Revolution 
includes the interests of  all people, and the Revolution means the interests of  the whole nation,” 
those who situate themselves outside it can be easily de-ontologized: denied the right to legitimately 
reflect upon Cuba (Garcia Santamaria 2019).
While some emergent media outlets try to be “conciliatory” and escape polarization, they often 
receive a similar treatment to oppositional ones. In this scenario, it seems that not even the most 
moderate voices manage to escape a polarized political context: “Even when you try to construct 
a discourse beyond that crossfire, the bullets are redirected against you,” says Cuban scholar and 
former journalist Alexei Padilla.20 Similarly, an independent journalist adds that it is hard to keep 
journalistic balance in “a climate of  flying slaps” (RJ16).21 It is a common perception that “the 
government is constantly treating you as an enemy, even when you do not want to be an enemy” 
(RJ13).22 The pervasive use of  terms such as “mercenaries” (those who oppose the regime) against 
independent journalists, “cyberclarias” (used for attacking those who defend the official discourse 
by any means) or “centrists” (those who reject extreme positions) are only examples of  the 
magnitude of  political polarization in Cuba.23
Once journalists leave the official media system, there is not much room for them in independent 
media outlets, nor are they very well paid if  they have to make a living abroad.  Therefore, some 
journalists work for media outlets that do not correspond with their journalistic ideas because they 
are seen as “too politicized.” However, their experience allows us to gain unique access to the ways 
in which polarization hinders professionalization in Cuba. One of  the main obstacles faced by 
oppositional media outlets, particularly those that existed before the emergent wave, is their “bad 
reputation,” which means that many people see them as hypercritical and do not want to give 
statements to them. One of  the journalists I interviewed acknowledges trying to get information 
19 Alexei Padilla, Doctor by Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil. Online interview conducted 
07/03/2020.
20 Alexei Padilla, Federal University of Minas Gerais. Online interview conducted 07/03/2020.
21 Interview number RJ16 to independent Cuban journalist. Online interview conducted 03/12/2019, updated  
07/16/2020.
22 Interview number RJ13 to independent journalist. Online interview conducted 05/15/2019.
23 The term “cyberclarias” refers to “cyber fighters” who use fake social media accounts in order to defend the 
Cuban regime, even at the cost of attacking critical voices and becoming “an army of trolls” (González 2019; 
Jiménez Enoa 2017). Some reporters have defended that many of them are trained at the UCI (Computer Science 
University) and receive Internet connection advantages in exchange.
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from moderate academics and intellectuals, often without success. “Then, the only people who end 
up giving you testimonies are those who are more burnt out, who have nothing to fear” (RJ12).24 In 
fact, there is the impression that Cuba is often narrated from a position of  (contained or not) fear, 
rage, and pain (RJ2, RJ10, RJ16).25 According to Cuban scholar José Raúl Gallego, the reason for 
this emotional coverage is that “the state tries to polarize you as much as possible in order to tag 
you as an extremist, as resented and all that, and then take you out of  the debate.”26
Previous research shows that young Cuban independent journalists have a tendency to politicize 
their emotional self  (Garcia Santamaria 2021). This means that, in a highly polarized system, 
they reject being pushed towards the edges of  the political and emotional spectrum: the soldier or 
the mercenary; the love for the project and the fear from it. While it is true that some currents of  
narrative journalism, such as El Estornudo, and many opinion pieces in magazines such as El Toque 
or La Joven Cuba embrace a marked emotional style. This emotionalization of  everyday experiences 
is seen as substantially different from the polarized emotionalization of  the Revolutionary 
experience and, therefore, as a form of  overcoming it. While the interviewees see expressing 
their emotions as something personally liberating, they should not permeate their journalistic 
practice because they might blind their capacity to think rationally, and to write from an impartial 
standpoint (in line with western normative ideals). This is an important detail that “professional” 
journalists use to differentiate themselves from “activists,” who are seen as emotionally taken by 
their political ideals and, therefore, less able to account for both the complexity and the paradoxes 
of  late socialism.27
Mellado et al. have concluded that Cuban journalists working in official media outlets have a 
loyal-facilitator role; that is, they tend to cooperate with the political elites and frame them, and 
praise both the government and the nation state. However, it seems that journalists working for 
the state also have the normative ideal of  playing a watchdog role (Mellado et al. 2016). While 
this can seem contradictory, it reflects the tension between young journalists’ normative ideals 
learned at university, often in line with western conceptions of  journalism, and journalistic 
practice in the state-run media. This has been repeatedly found by scholars who have conducted 
ethnographic research in Cuba (Garcia Santamaria 2018a; Oller and Olivera 2016; Mellado et al. 
2016). This idea is also prevalent in some independent media outlets, which explicitly state their 
will to hold the government accountable (Periodismo de Barrio 2018; Proyecto Inventario 2018), 
as well as the trend of  data journalism (Proyecto Inventario, Postdata) and fact-checking projects. For 
24 Interview number RJ12 to independent Cuban journalist. Online interview conducted 07/04/2020
25 Interviews RJ2, RJ10, RJ16 to independent Cuban journalists. Online interview RJ2 conducted 06/17/2019, 
updated the 14/07/2020; RJ10 conducted the 12/07/2019 and RJ16 conducted 03/12/2019, updated 
07/16/2020.
26 José Raúl Gallego, Universidad Iberoamericana. Online interview conducted 07/03/2020.
27 Some of the clearest indicators of an (at least partial) professionalization of Cuban journalism has been the 
award of international prizes, such as the Gabriel García Márquez (Mónica Baró, Jorge Carrasco) or the Online 
Journalism Awards (El Toque).
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instance, El Toque and Periodismo de Barrio offer, on Telegram and WhatsApp, a bot connected to the 
LatamCheque data base in order to verify information. The bot also allows users to request the 
editorial team to check certain information if  this mechanism is not able to do so.
The monitoring of  politicians’ Twitter accounts is one way used to keep power accountable. 
Some media outlets have followed the personal Twitter account of  President Miguel Díaz-Canel 
Bermúdez, @DiazCanelB  since its creation October 10, 2018 (Gallego Ramos 2019; Proyecto 
Inventario 2019a). Thanks to these analyses, we know that he shares mostly news from official 
media outlets (mostly Granma, followed by Cubadebate) and rarely replies to ordinary citizens. 
Over the first three months of  the account, the most common messages of  the president were 
slogans, such as #SomosCuba, #SomosContinuidad and #YoVotoSí (in reference to the new 
Constitution).28 The most quoted people were Fidel and Raúl Castro (Proyecto Inventario 2019b), 
stressing the historical legitimacy and authority of  his mandate.
Despite international recognition and attempts to hold leaders accountable, some interviewees 
consider that autonomy in journalism does not always lead to professionalization. Growing 
Internet access has facilitated the emergence of  a variety of  media outlets, some of  which have 
journalistic goals, while others are more focused on becoming profitable businesses through 
clickbait journalism, a focus on entertainment, or simply low standards. Even those that have a 
clear quality media vocation find problems accessing a variety of  sources, struggle to find funding 
and to reach Cuban readers beyond the intellectual elite. In fact, some interviewees consider that it 
would be easier to speak about an increase in “quality journalism,” which appears here and there 
in different media outlets. That is the opinion of  Dasniel Olivera, Fidel Alejandro Rodríguez, and 
some of  the journalists that I have interviewed for this report (RJ16, RJ7).29
PART 2: NAVIGATING LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY
2.1. The Legitimacy of Cuban Independent Journalism
Since its creation in 1965, the Cuban Communist Party assumed full responsibility in ideological 
matters and the restructuring of  the media system, subordinating them to the Ideological 
Department of  the Central Committee of  the Party. Journalistic practices are constrained by the 
structural conditions created by a soviet model of  party press, excessively bureaucratized and 
creating restrictive conditions that limit journalists’ autonomy, creativity and agency (García Luis 
2013; Garcia Santamaria 2018b).
28 WeAreCuba, #WeAareContinuity and #IVoteYes
29 Dasniel Olivera, Universidad Iberoamericana. Online interview conducted 07/02/2020/ Fidel Alejandro 
Rodríguez, Universidad de la Habana. Online interview conducted 07/10/2020/ Interview numbers RJ16 
and RJ7 to independent journalists. Online interview RJ16 conducted 03/12/2019, updated 07/16/2020 and 
online interview RJ7 conducted 07/03/2020.
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The historical conflict between the US and Cuba has also had an influence on the way the political 
elites have attempted to create unity around the Revolution, socialism and the fatherland in the 
face of  a permanent war against the enemy. This context has favored a way of  seeing independent 
media outlets as a threat. For instance, in the IX Congress of  the Union of  Cuban Journalists 
(UPEC), Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez (2013) included independent media outlets as part of  a 
US-led “political and ideological subversion” against Cuba, tagging journalists who collaborated 
with them as counterrevolutionary. 
The official view has sparked heated debates about the legitimacy and legality of  independent 
media outlets. The main strategy for delegitimizing independent media projects has targeted 
the source of  their funding, which comes from outside Cuba (mainly NGOs, readers’ donations, 
foundations, universities) since they are not officially recognized, are not legal entities, and cannot 
legally use advertisement. Funding is seen as a form of  “foreign interference” even if  this has been 
repeatedly denied by all independent media outlets. Some of  them, such as Periodismo de Barrio, 
Cibercuba or El Estornudo, have made their sources of  funding public. Abel Somohano, one of  the 
Cuban scholars interviewed for this report, considers that “the legitimacy of  journalism rests in the 
professionalization of  its practices, in the depth and seriousness in which messages are constructed, 
rather than funding.”30
There is another way of  looking at legitimacy: can state-run media outlets exercise journalism in a 
legitimate manner given their subordination to the Cuban Communist Party? All the interviewees 
consider that there are legitimate journalistic practices in official media, although they are not 
common due to the limitation of  journalists’ autonomy. However, these seem to be more common 
in state-owned regional media outlets, which attract less national attention and depend on lower-
rank party officers, some of  whom are known to be more open-minded. Despite working in a 
climate of  confrontation and polarization, the interviewees show a great deal of  respect towards 
fellow journalists who play more of  an activist role, whether on the state or the opposition side. 
While they acknowledge important disagreements, the idea is that they contribute to diversifying 
our views about Cuba: “they are generating a diversity of  views and this is important for 
constructing a historical memory with the highest possible number of  versions” (RJ2).31
One of  the most significant changes that has taken place recently has been the increasing mutual 
acceptance and understanding among journalists working for different independent media outlets. 
Many interviewees, and especially those who graduated before 2016, report a gradual but radical 
change in the way they see both the “independent media” and oppositional media outlets. José 
Raúl Gallego remembers that when he was at college “naming independent journalism was like 
naming the devil.” Similarly, an independent journalist considers that “two years ago it would have 
been unthinkable to sit at the same table as CubaNet or Diario de Cuba’s directors,” and adds: “I was 
30 Abel Somohano, Universidad Iberoamericana. Online interview conducted the 07/03/2020.
31 Interview number RJ2 to independent journalist. Online interview RJ2 conducted 06/17/2019, updated 
07/14/2020.
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terrorized by those media outlets: all the propaganda in my head told me that they were simply 
very bad people who did not do good journalism and who wanted to destroy Cuba” (RJ13).32 
However, there is a generational change taking place and most of  journalists are overcoming such 
fear and rejection.
The relationship among independent journalists has improved as they get to know each other 
and understand each other’s experiences. The interviews reveal that they started getting to know 
oppositional media outlets through personal ties, interacting with colleagues who worked there, 
and deciding that, above all, they remained friends. Another factor has been that journalists 
working for different independent media outlets have had chances to meet in person at conferences 
and training courses abroad, such as those organized by the IWPR (Institute of  War and Peace 
Reporting). This, according to the interviewees, has been essential for overcoming prejudices and 
many of  them have started finding shared causes and collective ways of  mobilizing themselves as a 
group.
2.2. The Legality of Cuban Independent Journalism
Over the last decade, Cuba has gone through a period of  power decentralization and legal 
reorganization that were announced at the I Conference of  Cuban Communist Party, in 2012, 
and which go hand in hand with the “Updating” of  the socioeconomic model that started one 
year before. Recently, these changes have materialized in the approval of  a new constitution, 
which reestablished the figure of  a Prime Minister in December 2019 (absent since 1976, when 
Fidel Castro became the President of  the Councils of  State and Ministers).33 The Constitution was 
approved by referendum and entered into force in April 2019.34
Article 54 of  the Constitution “recognizes, respects, and guarantees people freedom of  thought, 
conscience, and expression,” while Article 55 recognizes freedom of  the press “according to 
the law and for the good of  society” (Granma 2019). This type of  wording, acknowledging a 
right and then conditioning it to certain revolutionary values, is common. In fact, both the 2019 
Constitution and the “New Communication Policy for the State and Government” assert that the 
state leads the media and social communication in Cuba and the latter has the explicit goal of  
guaranteeing “national consensus and unity around the Fatherland, the Socialist Revolution, and 
the Party” (Cubadebate 2019).
32 Interview number RJ13 to independent journalist. Online interview conducted 05/15/2020
33 The Prime Minister, Manuel Marrero Cruz, has an executive function, supporting the President in internal 
matters.
34 The national referendum that preceded the approval of the 2019 Constitution created a diversity of positions, 
whether supporting the yes campaign, abstention or opposing it. In a way, we could say that having a campaign 
with a multiplicity of positions has activated  a public sphere of debate on itself, regardless of the overwhelming 
visibility of the yes campaign on public spaces, and the approval of the constitutional text (Sánchez Somonte, 
2019).
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The approval of  a new communication policy has been formally discussed behind closed doors 
since 2013 by a group of  experts chosen by the Party; eleven people in total, three of  whom were 
journalists. Official reports of  these discussions indicate that none of  these members formulated 
any opinions against the text (Gallego Ramos 2018). The policy has some interesting insights, 
such as questioning whether all state-owned media should be official voices of  the Party or mass 
organizations. In fact, it opens the door to other types of  organization and ways of  funding official 
media outlets, including advertisement. Furthermore, the document recognizes information and 
communication as public goods and, therefore, the media can only be state or social property, 
forbidding all private practices. The document makes only one reference to independent media 
outlets.  They are defined as precisely being private property (and therefore, illegal in constitutional 
terms), external to the country, and having “hypercritical” and “demobilizing goals” (Periodismo 
de Barrio 2018). Therefore, emergent independent media outlets are illegal not only because they 
are privately owned, but because they break away from the confines of  revolutionary consensus.
Besides the 2019 Constitution and Communication Policy, the legal restructuring in Cuba has been 
accompanied by the approval of  several decree-laws, none of  which has been publicly debated. 
Since then, we have seen the approval of  three important decree laws that directly affect artistic 
and intellectual production in Cuba: the decree-laws 349, 370, and 373. The first one is the 
decree-law 349, in effect since January 2018, which establishes restrictions on artistic production 
since they require previous approval by the Ministry of  Culture. Otherwise, hiring or working 
without this authorization can lead to fines, event cancellations, or a revocation of  working 
licenses. The restrictive side of  the decree-law has in fact sparked heated debates and the social 
media campaign #NoToThe349Decree (#NoAlDecreto349). The second is the decree-law 370 for 
the “computerization of  Cuban society,” in effect since July 2019, which deals with cybersecurity. 
There have been two main issues that have raised the alarm among independent journalists. One 
of  them is the illegality of  hosting websites on servers outside Cuba (unless it is a replica of  a main 
site on the island). This is necessarily the case of  independent media outlets since the national 
telecommunications company that could host their websites, ETECSA, “discriminates for political 
reasons” (Periodismo de Barrio 2019a). Although it is not clear whether this resolution can be 
applied to natural (physical, rather than juridical) persons, it legally could. Another issue has been 
the 370’s clause 68, which prohibits the dissemination of  information “contrary to the common 
good, morals, decency, and integrity” on social networks (MinCom, 2018: 26). 
Clause 68 has already have applied to punish some journalists, who have been summoned and 
fined in the midst of  the COVID-19 pandemic (Diario de Cuba 2020a; El Estornudo 2020). 
Independent journalist Claudia Padrón (2020b) has been collecting information from activists, 
journalists, and influencers who have been sanctioned in the name of  the 370 decree-law, which 
she keeps updated. According to Reporters without Borders, in the light of  this decree at least 
thirty people have been subjected to “interrogation, threats, and seizure of  work equipment 
(especially that of  journalists) for broadcasting their opinions on social media,” and twenty people 
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have received considerable fines (RSF 2020). Not paying those fines can be punished with six-
month prison sentences, something that seems to have been applied to several civil society actors 
(Proyecto Inventario 2020a; RSF 2020).
The ambiguous wording of  new laws and decrees, which give discretionary power to those 
applying them, is reinforced by what some interviewees call the “voluntarism” and “impunity” 
that characterize the security forces, which are able to impose their will without consequences. 
This would be particularly serious in the case of  decree-laws, since they impose administrative 
punishments that are faster and easier to apply than the penal code, which requires a long 
legal procedure. Adding another level of  complexity, several decree-laws seem to contradict 
constitutional rights. That is the case of  the Decree-Law 389, which modifies the Penal Code 
and legalizes electronic surveillance of  criminal acts originated abroad, while article 50 of  the 
Constitution guarantees the inviolability of  correspondence and other types of  communication 
(elTOQUE 2019).
To the Decree-Laws 349 and 370, we have to add 373, which regulates independent cinema and 
audiovisual production, legalizing independent moviemaking—and which was published in the 
Official Gazette in June 2019. This decree allows non-state-owned film production companies 
to legalize their status, something they had been demanding since the creation of  the Cuban 
Filmmakers Assembly (g-20) in 2013. Nevertheless, in order to be legal, they need approval by 
the Cuban Institute of  Cinematographic Arts and Industry (ICAIC), which also overviews the 
distribution, promotion, commercialization, and exhibition of  the works, and which can continue 
to censor filmmakers (Boza Ibarra et al. 2019). In fact, the 2020 Young Filmmakers Festival has 
been cancelled after the ICAIC’s directive board censored the documentary Sueños al pairo, directed 
by José Luis Aparicio Ferrera y Fernando Fraguela Fosado, due to “political and ideological 
differences” (elTOQUE 2020). In solidarity, other filmmakers withdrew their work, leading to the 
postponement of  the event. 
Another recent case of  censorship has been the 2018 film Quiero Hacer una Película (I want to make 
a movie), directed by Yimit Ramírez. While the film was initially shown in a small theatre, it ended 
up being cancelled for political reasons. The ICAIC Presidency “had not liked a sentence in the 
film,” referring to one of  the characters’ offensive comment about national liberation hero José 
Martí, and “rejected any disrespectful expressions towards national symbols and the main figures 
of  [Cuban] history” (El Cine es Cortar 2018). Similarly, Cuban “artivist” Luis Manuel Otero 
Alcántara was arrested in August 2019 for carrying a Cuban flag above his shoulders while walking 
around the city during carnival.35 A few days later, the Cuban government approved the National 
35 Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara was arrested outside his own home on March 1, 2020 and spent 13 days 
in prison waiting for trial. The arrest took place as he was leaving his home in order to participate in a protest in 
front of the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television (ICRT), which had censored a gay kiss from their broadcast of 
the film Love, Simon (directed by Greg Berlanti). Among the charges that he accumulates are property damage, 
desecration of patriotic symbols (he has a performance carrying the Cuban flag in his shoulders during carnival). 
He was released on March 14, 2020.
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Symbols of  the Republic of  Cuba law, or Law 128, which was published in the Official Gazette of  
the Republic on September 19, 2019. The law establishes that Cubans should venerate national 
symbols: “All Cubans have the duty of  respecting, taking care of, and paying homage to these 
symbols, as well as foreigners that are on the national territory” (del Sol González 2020) and can 
be used for censoring artistic and journalistic production.
While official symbols are reduced in the law to “the flag of  the lonely star, the Bayamo anthem 
and the royal palm tree shield,” there are many unofficial symbols that are sacred in the official 
discourse, including that of  the official press. For instance, on January 1, 2020, some statues of  
José Martí, national hero and father of  Cuban independence in the 19th century, were desecrated 
with pig’s blood. To this, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez declared that “those 
who dishonor their deepest roots do not deserve to be called Cuban” (Melo, 2020). The debate, 
therefore, is not whether it is fair to damage national symbols but whether someone can be less 
Cuban, or a bad Cuban, for disrespecting them. Who has the power to determine who deserves 
to be a Cuban journalist, and what happens with those who are denied that honor? Similarly, in 
Otero Alcántara’s case, the debate is not whether Cuban “artivists” deserve being called artists, 
but whether citizens have the right to oppose the government through intellectual and artistic 
production. Are Cubans allowed to dissent, to provoke, to disobey? (Viera Cañive and Nieves 
Cárdenas 2020).
2.3. Consequences of Official Illegitimacy and Illegality
As we have seen, several elements contribute to the limitation of  freedom of  the press and 
expression in Cuba. One of  them is the subordination of  intellectual and artistic expressions to 
socialist goals, morals, and values through the Constitution and restrictive decree-laws, added to 
the state’s monopoly over all legal Cuban outlets and their censorship. More recently, there has 
been a declaration of  all independent (or non-state-owned) media outlets as illegal and illegitimate, 
even blocking access to some of  them. Furthermore, in Cuba, there are still limitations to Internet 
access (although access has progressively increased since 2013, reach and cost are still a problem), 
digital surveillance and seemingly state-supported smear campaigns against critical (even if  not 
oppositional) voices.
The last few years have seen an increase in repression, particularly in the light of  COVID-19-
related special measures, as well as in the public visibility of  its denunciations (Diario de Cuba 
2020b; Proyecto Inventario 2020b, 2020c; RSF 2020). Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, an event had 
already set all alarms off the weekend of  January 18, 2020: the simultaneous blockage of  virtually 
all Cuban independent media outlets (adding Periodismo de Barrio, El Toque, La Joven Cuba and 
OnCuba News to the usual list). Although those that are not usually blocked were rapidly available, 
the event has been interpreted as a trial, in case the government considered necessary to do so in 
the future.
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Reporters without Borders classifies Cuba as the worst Latin American country in freedom of  
the press, number 171 in the world out of  180 countries (RSF, 2021). In June 2020, the Inter-
American Commission of  Human Rights (IACHR), which is an organ of  the Organization of  
American States (OAS, 2020), published a report on human rights violations against Cuban 
independent journalists, even those who work for socialist media outlets, such as Periodismo de Barrio, 
or who publish critical yet not oppositional pieces. 
It can be challenging to understand why Cuba rates so low in international freedom of  expression 
and freedom of  the press indexes when there are no killings of  journalists reported. One of  the 
reasons is that violence can be direct, but also indirect. Indirect attacks have been reported in other 
restrictive countries such as Venezuela (Garcia Santamaria and Salojärvi 2020), China (Repnikova 
2017), Eritrea (Jolley 2016), and Turkey (Ataman and Coban 2019). The notion of  “anti-press 
harassment” (Hughes and Márquez-Ramírez 2018) is useful for encompassing a broad range 
of  practices that include less visible ways of  undermining freedom of  speech, such as threats, 
harassment, smear, and intimidation campaigns, and structural and symbolic violence (Brambila 
and Hughes 2019). Some Cuba-specific tactics have been the imposition of  travel restrictions, 
police raids at home or at work, the confiscation of  working materials, or arbitrary arrests. 
Regarding freedom of  the press, all journalists who are not affiliated with the Journalists’ Union 
(UPEC) are unable to obtain a journalistic accreditation even if  they have completed a Journalism 
degree. If  they are caught reporting on the street, they are reminded that they are unauthorized to 
do so and can be threatened, arrested, and become a target of  the security forces. Threats expand, 
on occasions, to independent journalists’ social circle: colleagues, friends, even relatives (14yMedio 
2018; CIDH 2020), something causing great psychological distress (Garcia Santamaria, 2019). 
Arbitrary detentions, which some interviewees call “kidnapping” (RJ4, RJ7), take place when 
there is no previous arrest order against a person, nor is it caught committing a crime.36 There are 
multiple examples of  journalists who were arbitrary detained while reporting or who tried to leave 
their home and were stopped by policemen who “recommend” them not to go anywhere. That is, 
simply put, a type of  home arrest. Even when they are taken to a police station or put in custody, 
there is often no official document that proves detention. Formally, they have never been arrested. 
Recently, three journalists from El Estornudo were stopped from leaving their home and their 
mobile data was taken away. However, it is hard to prove because it leaves no material trace and 
this sparks suspicion, even among their own colleagues.  Repeatedly, in the interviews, journalists 
noted how they themselves were “a little bit naïve” (RJ9) or “skeptical” (RJ16) until they were 
arrested themselves.37 The consequence is often an overwhelming feeling of  fear, paranoia, and 
vulnerability and a sense that the government could arrest them, short term or even long term, if  
36 Interviews number RJ4 and RJ7 to independent journalists. Online interview RJ4 conducted 06/23/2019 
and updated the 02/07/2020. Online interview RJ7 conducted 07/03/2020.
37 Interviews number RJ9 and RJ16 to independent journalists. Online interview RJ9 conducted 07/12/2019 
and online interview RJ16 conducted 03/12/2019, updated 07/16/2020.
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it wanted to (RJ1, RJ2, RJ6, RJ7, RJ9, RJ12, RJ13, RJ22).38 During detentions, it is usual that the 
authorities erase all the information from journalists’ devices, or simply confiscate them, which is 
legal under the recent 349 and 370 decree-laws, creating great professional distress (Viera Cañive 
2019).
During our interviews, several journalists noted what they saw as an important generational 
change in independent journalism: endurance, something that older generations had but that 
young generations are running out of. For instance, El Estornudo (2020) has reported that one of  
its collaborators, Yoe Suárez, has been interrogated six times in the first half  of  2020.  He was 
informed that he is not allowed to leave the country and has received threats to his family. As one 
independent journalist noted:  “There is a new generation of  recently graduated young journalists 
that does not resist repression the same way. When they are arrested two, four times, they say: ‘I 
don’t want to live my whole life like this, I don’t want this to be my future, I don’t want to have 
children in this country.’ And they decide to emigrate” (RJ3).39
The journalist giving this statement was arrested twice. The second time, he was obliged to 
sign a document called “warning agreement” (“acta de advertencia”), which stated that he had lost 
the chance to exercise journalism in the countrybecause he left state-run media and would no 
longer be able to do so. After that, he became scared of  getting arrested at any time and decided 
to emigrate. When journalists are arrested, some are obliged to sign an “acta” in which they 
commit to not exercising journalism again, since they are not authorized to do so (Periodismo de 
Barrio 2019b; Viera Cañive 2019). The warning has the goal of  making independent journalists 
uncomfortable, confused, and scared since they can face criminal trials if  they appear as 
committing subsequent “delinquent” acts.40
The most common charges against independent journalists, besides “helping the enemy” 
(Periodismo de Barrio 2019b), refer to unproved common crimes such as theft (Curbelo 2019) or 
making purchases on the black market, despite it being an essential part of  Cuban’s “invento” and 
a major survival strategy for Cubans faced with scarce food and first necessity products. Other 
purported crimes include contempt (for instance, when the police ask them to stop recording or to 
give them their recordings and they refuse to do so) (ICLEP 2020a), usurpation of  legal capacities 
(since they are not legally registered as journalists) (Periodismo de Barrio 2019b), and, in the midst 
of  the COVID-19 crisis, propagation of  the pandemic.
38 Interviews number RJ1, RJ2, RJ6, RJ7, RJ9, RJ12, RJ13, RJ22 to independent journalists. Online interview RJ1 
conducted 06/10/2019; online interview RJ2 conducted 06/17/2019, updated 07/14/2020; online interview 
RJ13 conducted 05/15/2020; online interview RJ6 conducted 07/07/2019; online interview RJ7 conducted 
07/04/2020; online interview RJ12 conducted  07/04/2020; online interview RJ13 conducted 05/15/2019 
and personal interview in Valencia (Spain) RJ22 conducted 07/07/2020.
39 Interview number RJ13 to independent journalist. Online interview conducted 05/15/2019.
40 Currently, Cubanet journalist Roberto Quiñones is in prison after he was condemned to a one-year sentence 
for resistance and disobedience (CIDH, 2020).
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Despite the current wave of  repression, which interviewees trace back to 2018, they also 
noted several positive changes. One of  them is that the social marginalization and rejection of  
independent journalists seems to be decreasing. For instance, recent demonstrations and joint 
petitions have shown a growing solidarity between activists (as well as artivists) and independent 
journalists. A second opportunity is that, while silence, shame, and fear predominated for a long 
time, nowadays those who are arrested often publish their stories, performing acts of  political 
visibility in the digital age (Viera Cañive 2019). A third change, according to the interviewees, is 
that independent media outlets have found shared interests and have started making them public 
through joint declarations. 
2.4. Restating Legitimacy and Requesting Legality
In a previous section, I have examined the 2018 polemics at the ICAIC’s Young Filmmakers 
Festival. This event and the lack of  news about a cinema law took a group of  filmmakers, 
identified as Cardumen, to sign a joint declaration on their Facebook page in March of  that same 
year. In the declaration, they denounced the “defamation” of  critical filmmakers and producers 
in the official media and opposed an understanding of  cinema that “seeks to put [the audience] 
to sleep so they mimetically reproduce worn down behaviors, values, and ideologies, disconnected 
from the complex context” in which Cubans live (Cardumen 2018). This declaration is meaningful 
because independent filmmakers have inspired independent journalists, who have followed their 
example.
In the last few years, some independent media outlets have joined forces and published, for the first 
time, joint declarations asking for freedom of  speech and the end of  journalists’ harassment. The 
joint declarations are, according to the interviews, the most relevant change in Cuban independent 
journalism so far. The first joint declaration was released in October 7, 2019, and gathered 
nineteen independent media projects (Diario de Cuba 2019).41 The declaration denounced 
the increase of  attacks against journalists in what it called “a wave of  repression against the 
independent press,” which includes psychological intimidation, verbal attacks, cyber-harassment, 
and defamation, among others.
In the declaration, independent media outlets stated their legitimacy to exist but also their 
Cubanness, that is, their right to be Cubans—despite being critical ones. Besides legitimacy, they 
also claimed legality, asking for the legalization of  independent journalism and the repeal of  any 
laws and decrees that tackle freedom of  speech and freedom of  expression (Diario de Cuba 2019). 
41 The independent media outlets that signed this first declaration, and which have continued supporting 
consecutive ones, are: 14ymedio, ADN Cuba, Alas Tensas, Árbol Invertido, Asociación Pro Libertad de Prensa 
(APLP), CiberCuba, Convivencia, CubaNet, Diario de Cuba, El Estornudo, Havana Times, Hypermedia 
Magazine, La Hora de Cuba, Play-Off Magazine, Proyecto Inventario, Puente a la Vista, Rialta, Tremenda Nota, 
YucaByte.
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In return, they committed to certain ethical and professional values: truthfulness, public interest, 
fact-checking, objectivity, impartiality, and the differentiation between information, opinion and 
advertisement. 
The second declaration was published on March 10, 2020 (ADN Cuba 2020) and was addressed 
against the summary trial of  visual artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, who was released from 
jail after an international outcry. While these joint declarations are not signed by all independent 
media outlets, they have served as a way of  uniting most of  them around a shared cause. A 
few years ago, it would have been unthinkable to see, in the same declaration, activists, citizen 
journalists and journalists who have graduated from Cuban public universities. In fact, they saw 
themselves as belonging to two different worlds. Another reason that explains why these joint 
declarations are so important is that “they break away with the culture of  fear inculcated into 
Cubans from childhood” (Dafoe 2020), a fear against becoming the internal enemy.
A third joint request took place on June 6, 2020, and was updated in June 15, when around fifty 
Cuban independent media outlets and international organizations declared the Decree-Law 
370 unconstitutional.42 All signatory media outlets disseminated the request on their websites 
denouncing the decree’s clear restriction of  freedom of  expression, association, and political 
participation, considering it contrary to Articles 8, 40, 41, 47, 54 and 228 of  the 2019 Constitution 
(Proyecto Inventario 2020a, 2020b). Another joint declaration of  Cuban independent media 
outlets and international organizations was released a month later, on July 3, asking for the 
liberation of  journalist Jorge Enrique Rodríguez, who was arrested for contempt and faced prison 
charges (ICLEP, 2020b).  He was released that same day. 
2.5. Escalation of Unrest
Tension between the Government and civil society has been escalating since late 2020. The trigger 
was the arrest of  rapper Denis Solís in late November. Since Solís belonged to the Movimiento 
San Isidro (MSI), some of  its members started a hunger strike in solidarity that lasted ten days, 
until they were evicted from their premises on November 26. Videos and testimonies of  violence 
sparked a chain reaction. On November 27, about three hundred artists and intellectuals gathered 
in front of  the Ministry of  Culture (Havana), asking for greater artistic and intellectual freedom 
and demanding a meeting with government officials. In an unprecedented move, Vice Minister of  
Culture Fernando Rojas agreed to meet with thirty representatives that same night and to open 
new channels for bilateral dialogue. 
The demonstration culminated with the creation of  the 27N movement. In a formal request, the 
group designated the head of  the MSI, Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, and some independent 
journalists, as spokespersons. However, the Ministry did not like this move, and hopes were dashed 
when it linked Otero Alcántara and other intellectuals to foreign anti-Cuban organizations. 
42 The request was presented on June 8 to the National Assembly, the Council of State and the Supreme Court.
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This series of  events has sparked a new wave of  repression against intellectuals, including 
independent journalists. In fact, several journalists have denounced summons by the police, 
interrogations, and incarceration threats. Journalists’ consensus is that the state is running out of  
moves. “They could not silence us, it’s time to discredit us,” wrote Periodismo de Barrio’s editor-in-
chief  Elaine Díaz on Twitter (DDC 2020). This has been accompanied by a smear campaign on 
national television. One of  the most flagrant examples has been TV anchor Humberto López, 
who has accused independent journalists and artists of  supporting a “yanqui” intervention in 
Cuba, threatening them with prison (Cibercuba 2021). Civil society has responded in turn, by 
creating a social media campaign that invites citizens to shut their TV down during the evening 
newscast, using the #NTVmiente (national television lies) and the #YoApagoYoAhorro (I shut [it] 
down, I save) hashtags. 
Two months after the initial demonstration, on January 27, a number of  members of  the MSI and 
27N movement gathered in front of  the Ministry of  Culture for a second time, unchaining further 
repression (Cubadebate 2021b). Ever since, the 27N has filed a motion to dismiss the Culture 
Minister, Alpidio Alonso Grau, who was recorded physically confronting pacific demonstrators.43 
In doing so, he violated Article 56 of  the Constitution, which ensures citizens’ right to peaceful 
protests. Furthermore, the petitioners listed seven other laws that would legally support the 
dismissal.
Amid this surge in confrontation, new regulations have restated the illegality of  independent 
journalistic practice. In February 2021, the Ministry of  Work issued an apparently innocuous list 
of  2000 activities that could be developed by the private sector. However, the list also included 124 
that were reserved to the state, including artistic, cultural, and journalistic jobs, as well as education 
and health workers (Cubadebate 2021a). In this context, the hopes for dialogue that arose in late 
2020 have stalled and the polarization between the state and civil society seems greater than ever. 
Final Remarks
This report has examined the impact of  digital technologies in the life of  Cuban citizens creating a 
new type of  “mobile postsocialism” (Duong 2021) that has a political potential, yet manifests itself  
in the creation of  a range of  business, professional, and emotional spheres that are increasingly 
shared by Cubans on the Island and abroad. This is no different in the emergent independent 
mediasphere, which is composed of  media outlets with a clear quality and public service vocation, 
while others are more business or entertainment oriented. The unfolding of  the independent 
mediasphere has been taking place amid a new wave of  governmental repression against 
independent journalism, dating back to 2018, and which has seen an increase of  measures that 
make its practice both illegitimate and illegal. The levels of  polarization in Cuban political culture 
mean that even journalists who are willing to “moderate” their criticism to enable dialogue are 
harassed and accused of  being US mercenaries who want to discredit the government. 
43 https://www.change.org/p/ministerio-de-cultura-de-cuba-dimisi%C3%B3n-de-alpidio-alonso
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The approval of  new legislation increasingly justifying arrests and administrative punishments for 
ideological reasons, and the traditional impunity and voluntarism of  the security forces, together 
create a climate of  fear and vulnerability in which practicing independent journalism becomes 
an arduous task, often leading to young journalists’ migration. Nevertheless, the report highlights 
positive changes that have allowed Cuban independent journalists to unite around ideals of  
professionalism and watchdog practices, but also around common interests. In fact, one of  the 
main changes has been the improvement of  relations between journalists who are close to activism 
and those who defend professional impartiality. This has enabled the publication of  a series of  
joint declarations in which many independent media outlets denounce the curtailing of  freedom 
of  speech and freedom of  the press.  These declarations help gather international attention around 
their causes in an effort to regain legitimacy and publicly request legality.
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